Union of Parliaments

David Kidney: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is important to reassure the public that voting by post is secure and reliable? Will she confirm that she will take care not to impose so many restrictions that the bureaucracy deters people from applying for a postal vote and voting by post?

Tony McNulty: I beg to move,
	That the Order of 28th June 2005 (Identity Cards Bill (Programme)) be further varied as follows:
	For paragraph 4 substitute—
	"4. Proceedings on consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at this day's sitting at the time specified in the second column of the following Table.
	
		TABLE
		
			  
			 Proceedings Time for conclusion ofproceedings 
			 New clauses and amendments relating to Clause 1 5.45 p.m. 
			 Amendments relating to Clauses 2 to 7 7.15 p.m. 
			 Remaining proceedings on consideration One hour before the moment of interruption." 
		
	
	First, may I say that the motion is intended to assist the House in using our available time this afternoon on Report to the very best possible effect? We have made good progress on the Bill thus far. There have been seven days and 11 sittings in Committee, starting on 5 July and finishing on 21 July. We had a timetable motion in Committee in order to ensure good progress, but as a result of the knives, only clauses 12 and 13 and parts of clause 5 failed to be discussed—some seven groups of amendments in all. We certainly debated far more than seven groups of amendments in Committee.
	Although I should point out that there was plenty of time to raise issues, I am told that we spent, in total, some 26 hours and six minutes in all. We were even offered the possibility of a final sitting on the afternoon of 21 July, but in the event it was not needed or required by Opposition parties. We thus had more than sufficient time.
	Because of the need to make the best use of available time, we propose to divide today's timetable with knives at 5.45 and 7.15 to ensure that all parts of the Bill are properly scrutinised.
	I readily recognise that there are important and serious matters for us to discuss, but we need to parcel up the business in this way to allow for Third Reading at 9 pm as normal. If hon. Members want to debate the Bill, they should accept the motion and let us get on with that debate. The House will surely agree that it would be better for us to spend time this afternoon debating the Bill and the substantial matters before us rather than taking time to debate at length whether or not to timetable the debate. With that in mind, our motion will help order our debate sensibly.

Douglas Hogg: I rise to support the observations of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier). The Minister in his opening remarks said that the motion was for the assistance of the House so as to make best use of the time available to us. The time available to us is the amount of time provided by the Government. If they truly wanted to assist the House, they would have given us a great deal more time, especially as the Bill will not come into early effect. The reality is that there is ample time for proper consideration.
	My hon. and learned Friend sketched out the principal arguments against timetable motions of this kind, and I shall add one or two further comments. First, we must never forget that the Report stage is the only opportunity for Members of this House who were not members of the Standing Committee to scrutinise the detail of a Bill. On this occasion, they will be allowed no more than five hours for that detailed scrutiny. In my view, that is wrong in principle.
	My second point is rather different, although the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) alluded to it when he spoke about retaining a tight focus when framing his amendments. It is that hon. Members faced with tight guillotines often do not table the amendments that they would table if more time were available. As a consequence, Bills are not being scrutinised properly. The grossest example of a Bill that was not properly scrutinised is the one that became the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which has been criticised time and again, in the Court of Appeal and elsewhere, for its inadequate construction and the poor scrutiny that it received here. The same thing is happening again.
	I hope that the House will never allow a timetable motion to go through without a protest and a vote. The Government say that that will circumscribe debate. Although true, that is unworthy of this House—but typical of this Government.

David Heath: I am grateful, Mr. Speaker.
	The Home Affairs Committee reported on 20 July 2004—more than a year before the end of the Standing Committee process. The House has thus not had the benefit of the inquisitorial method of working that Select Committees use.
	Three matters of principal concern have arisen since the end of the Standing Committee, the first of which is costs. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have repeatedly raised the question of costs throughout the passage of the Bill because it is critical to our understanding of what the national identity card system will mean. Some of us believe that the large investment that the Government propose would be better spent on other forms of detecting and preventing crime, but that is an aside. We need to know the Government's intentions, which were made clear only in the past few days through what the press described as a string of concessions to critics in an effort to avert a rebellion. I do not know whether a rebellion will be averted, but I do know that the House is entitled critically to examine the Government's costings. We must be assured that the costings are robust and capable of being realised. We especially need to examine the Minister's proposed arrangements to recoup funds from other Departments, which will be critical to the working of the scheme.
	Secondly, we must consider something that is rather inelegantly called function creep. The Minister has been somewhat undermined by his colleagues in the Cabinet Office, because the Government's chief information officer's draft information technology strategy has been leaked over the past few days. On identity cards, it is important to note that the document reveals:
	"Identity management is a subject whose time has now arrived."
	It says that the Government are leading the debate on identity cards and will be using it as part of a
	"suite of identity management solutions"
	to enable public and private sectors to provide cost-effective electronic services. The document also says that data sharing will increase under new proposals.
	Those are legitimate matters of concern for many hon. Members, so we want to find out what the Cabinet Office proposes and whether the Home Office agrees.
	Thirdly, the efficacy of the proposals—their ability to do what they say they will do—is a matter of huge concern among many hon. Members. In the past few days—after the Standing Committee concluded—we found out the results of tests on the card system. The system works perfectly well—unless a person is disabled, has dark skin, has brown eyes, is bald, or is wrinkled. If someone makes the mistake of being bald and wrinkled, the system tells them that their head is upside down. If a person is a labourer, typist, or pianist, the system does not work. The system does not work if a person undertakes a voluntary change of appearance, which that rules out every teenager in the country. If people make the mistake of ageing, identity card technology is not for them. In fact, it has been revealed that one in 1,000 cases result in a misidentification. As 13.5 million people a month go through British airports, there will be 13,500 misidentifications every month, which will do wonders for the queues at security checks.
	The Minister's response is that multiple identifiers will cure that problem, but I draw the House's attention to the front page of today's The Scotsman. It says that ID cards equal more fraud and quotes at length Mr. Jerry Fishenden, the national technology officer for Microsoft—a company one would expect to know something about the subject—who says that the identity card scheme as envisaged will result in "massive identity fraud" on a scale as yet unseen. On balance, I prefer the evidence of the Microsoft bosses to that of the Minister, but it is for a Select Committee to look in detail at the proposals. It could call Mr. Fishenden to give evidence.

Tony McNulty: I fully intend to give the motion the short shrift that it deserves. The matters of substance about which the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) spoke will be dealt with, not just by the House in our remaining time today but by the other place. As the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) will agree, we look at things 61 times whenever matters of substance and detail come back to the House. As I have repeatedly said, this is enabling legislation.
	As for the history of the proposal, the simple fact is that the his Bill and the policy underlying it have probably received more consultation and scrutiny than most legislation. That started in 2002 with an initial six-month public consultation on the entitlement cards and identity fraud consultation paper. An inquiry by the Home Affairs Committee began in 2003 following publication of the Government's policy statement on the introduction of identity cards in "Identity Cards—The Next Steps" in November 2003. The draft Identity Cards Bill was published in April 2004.

Patrick Mercer: I can certainly confirm that the human rights elements of what might be called the Big Brother aspects of the card have been explored thoroughly in Committee. To my mind, those aspects are hugely disagreeable, but if the Government wish to control a population, put a population under surveillance or poke their nose into every detail of someone's life, I can see that those aspects could be viewed as highly desirable. I would reply to the hon. Gentleman by posing the question whether the card could ever work?

Patrick Mercer: The old aphorism relating to any form of computer or intelligence work is, "Rubbish in, rubbish out." Unless we get it right from the first principles, the card and the register stand little chance of success.—[Interruption.] I seem to have had the desired effect on my own Benches.—[Laughter.] We are getting the chance to check the dentures of one of my colleagues, thereby establishing his identity beyond doubt.—[Laughter.]

John Gummer: I am one of those in the House who believes in identity cards. My problem with the Bill is that the Government have shown an infallible ability so to form it that it drives away from its support the very people whose support one would have thought that they could have gained.
	The amendments go to the heart of the matter. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) has rightly pointed out that with this Bill the Government have given themselves every possibility to do almost anything in any circumstances. Many of us who are not unhappy with the concept of an identity card are unhappy with the concept of a Government who give themselves powers like that. Governments have an insatiable desire for power and therefore will use it in ways that most of us will find unacceptable.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) made the point that seems to me central to this issue. If we are to agree with the Government that we should have identity cards, we need to know three clear things. First, what restrictions on the use of identity information will the Government put permanently in place and what mechanisms will they use to do so? We need to know the scope of the legislation. These clauses show that the scope is in no way restricted. It is envisaged to be as wide as the Government think it should be at any particular time.
	The second issue that the amendments raise is what the Government think that the identity card might do. I happen to think that there are certain areas in which it would be helpful and useful to have a unique register of everybody's name and address. It is possible to argue that that could be portrayed on a card. I happen to think the other way round from my hon. and learned Friend; I think that the register is more important than the card. Be that as it may, there are mechanisms by which this could be done. What the Government cannot do is to claim for identity cards things that are self-evidently not true. The Government in so doing are driving away people who might otherwise have been corralled. It seems to me that the Government are making a series of claims, hoping that one way or another they will pick up the support of all sorts of people whose support they would not otherwise have gained. In fact, the opposite is happening. As each of these claims is made and found wanting, people begin to ask whether the whole idea is a sensible one.
	The third issue that the amendments raise is what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough referred to as "Will it work?" Unless we know its scope and what it is supposed to do, we can make no judgment as to whether this particular scheme—let alone the technology, which one cannot deal with on this group of amendments—will work. None of these things seem to me to be evident from the Bill. It is an inconvenience of the House that in these days of truncated debates and the significantly underused potential of Parliament, the only way in which we can get at these things is by tabling amendments such as this and asking for sensible responses. So I put three simple questions to the Minister. Will he put in the Library a list of the specific purposes of the Bill? What does he think he will be able to do after he has got it that he cannot do now? Will he, perhaps with a little narrative, describe incidents that could have been better dealt with if only he had had this particular equipment? That seems to me to be what any sensible person would do if they were running a business and thinking of spending a lot of money. They would ask how they could be in a better position and whether the solution would have been cost-effective if applied to their past actions.
	Perhaps the Minister could explain the role of the identity card in the prevention of terrorism. I can see that it would be useful in circumstances in which someone claims to be Mr. Jones to check whether they are indeed that person. That is a satisfactory concept, but I cannot see how widely that could be used in the direct battle against terrorism. The Minister should tell us more about that.
	I have always thought that it would be very helpful for people in this country to know that those people who claim benefits are entitled to them and not fiddling the system. I think that not for atavistic reasons, but because I happen to believe that benefits are an important part of a civilised society and people should not be besmirched because the system does not work very well. We have heard such contradictory views from the Government about how ID cards could be used against fraud, how much that might save and how many people might be involved, that it is difficult for any sane person to make a judgment. Many of us want to make a judgment, because we are not here for theological reasons only. Can the Minister give a definitive statement of how ID cards and the register will be useful in that area?

Andy Burnham: I apologise to those Opposition Members who still wish to speak, but this section of debate will conclude a quarter to 6, and a lot of serious issues have been raised about the purpose of the scheme, so it is only right to address them in detail.
	Clause 1, with which we are preoccupied, sets out the purpose of the national identity register, and I would tell the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) that two very clear statutory purposes for the Bill are given in that clause: first, to provide a convenient method by which individuals can prove who they are—he recognised that he might indeed welcome that—and, secondly, to provide a secure and reliable method by which public bodies and others can ascertain identification and thereby better serve the public interest.

Andy Burnham: I will not give way, but as the hon. Gentleman as raised the issue on many occasions I shall give him one instance of a serious crime that identity cards could help to prevent. Last week, on Tuesday 11 October, Metro revealed that a fraudster who created 130 false identities to swindle hundreds of banks out £1.1 million was jailed for five and a half years. Identity fraud is not a figment of our imagination—it is a real problem that affects more and more of my constituents and perhaps the hon. Gentleman's too. The issue is repeatedly brought to our attention, so it is right to take action against it.

Question accordingly negatived.
	It being after quarter to Six o'clock, Mr Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put the Question to be decided at that hour.
	Amendment made: No. 1, in page 2, line 20 [Clause 1], at end insert—
	'(5A) But the registrable facts falling within subsection (5) (g) do 'not include any sensitive personal data (within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c.29)) or anything the disclosure of which would tend to reveal such data.'.—[Andy Burnham.]

Edward Garnier: I see that the Wolfgang element has emerged. I assure the hon. Gentleman that no Government run by my party would bundle such people out or have them arrested under the terrorist legislation. I look forward to the support of the Liberal Democrats later in this debate, and I assure them that if they need protection, a Conservative Government will protect them from the increasing activities of the police and the state. Many Members might think that the Liberal Democrats are in need of a quite a lot of protection. At this stage, however, I want to concentrate on the important issues that the amendments allow us to discuss.
	The hon. Member for Walthamstow began his speech by discussing the concept of the designated document. We had that discussion at some little length in Committee, and at no stage were the Government able to tell us precisely what they meant by the category of designated documents that they were going to include. What we discovered, which was instructive, is that the list is open-ended, undefined and designed to allow the Government, through clause 5, slowly but surely to allow a greater category of documents to become designated.
	In Committee, the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) and I discussed all the kinds of licences that one can get at a post office, and the Government had absolutely no idea whether those would be designated. We also realised that 20 per cent. of the population have never had, and never will have, a passport, which represents a huge proportion of the British population. In Committee, the Minister of State said:
	"We have made no secret of the fact that registration on the database will ultimately be compulsory—we want universal coverage. That means two things: it might be appropriate to designate other documents, and it might be that the designation of such documents means a faster coverage of the entire population."—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 12 July 2005; c. 177.]
	At no stage—I am sure that the Minister will confirm this—was he able to produce a list of those documents that he hoped would become designated. Through the Bill, the Government are therefore asking us to give them a blank cheque simply to increase the creeping designation of documents. That is a wholly unhealthy way to design a piece of legislation, and it is even more unhealthy for Parliament to give the Government unseen powers over the citizen and the way in which he or she conducts his or her life. I therefore urge Members to listen carefully to what the hon. Gentleman said.
	I will leave the Liberal Democrat spokesman to deal at greater length with amendments Nos. 39, 36, 37 and 38. Clause 5, however, deals with applications relating to entries in the register, and with the powers that the Home Secretary will give himself, which we have not seen in any written form, to compel us as citizens to do what he wants. For example, he will be able to compel us to provide such information as he thinks fit—which is undefined—for the purpose of verifying information that may be entered in the register about an individual in consequence of his having made an application to go on the register. One is given the impression that applying to go on the register is something for which the Government are deeply grateful, and that it is a voluntary activity, but it is not—it is distinctly compulsory and the limits of the Secretary of State's powers are undefined. The Government really ought to have the self-confidence to condescend to let us see the statutory instruments containing the 61 powers that they intend that we should be bound by. That is in parentheses, however.
	Under the Bill, individuals may be required to attend a specified place at a particular time in order to register, and to give up information about themselves to go into this huge, great national register—this great bucket of private information that will slosh around between the various Departments and agencies, and to which private companies might even have access for a fee. If we consider the creeping way in which the Bill gives powers to the Government, it might well be that aspects of this data register will be available to certain private companies. As the Government farm out their functions to private companies, and if that is to work properly, those private companies must have access, if not to the whole of the information, at least to sections of it. I urge Members of the House to be very careful before they allow the Government to move down that road.
	Let us assume, however, that one lives in the Outer Hebrides, Orkney or Shetland, and there does not happen to be a suitable place to register on those islands, or let us assume that one is in rural Devon, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire or even Bournemouth—[Laughter.] Let us assume that one will be required to travel some considerable distance, at one's own expense, to this gulag, where the Government will have one fingerprinted, photographed and otherwise processed. Why should the citizen be compelled, at the Home Secretary's direction, to travel around the country looking for the place where they must provide all this information? Why should he be compelled to travel to such a place to have his fingerprints and other biometric information taken and recorded, when one bears in mind that these are by and large not exactly secure methods of determining a person's identity?
	Let us consider fingerprints. In Leicester, which is the nearest large city to my constituency of Harborough, the Government subjected people to the fingerprint test in a pilot scheme to see whether it would happily provide a sensible biometric system. Of the 772 people who submitted their fingerprints in Leicester, 642, or 83.16 per cent., were identified correctly—the lowest rate of any test centre in the United Kingdom—and there was a failure rate of almost 17 per cent. in matching the individual to the fingerprint. Across the country, approximately 45 million to 48 million people over the age of 16 will be required to add to the convenience of this Government by providing an entry on the register and giving in addition the information found in the schedule. Seventeen per cent. of between 45 million to 48 million people is a very big number, and yet this is the system that the Government are compelling us and our constituents to adhere to. There is not simply a smack on the wrist but a fine—a civil penalty—of up to £2,500 if an individual or one of their family members over the age of 16 fails or refuses to do what is required by the Secretary of State under one of the as yet unseen statutory instruments.

Martin Linton: We have heard a lot of rhetoric tonight and we can congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard). His amendment would change only word, but it is the crucial word of the Bill. I happen to take the opposite view to his, but I recognise that this is the central part of the Bill.
	Let me take my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow back to the beginning of the process. We have had several White Papers, the first of which, issued by the Home Office, distinguished between different possible schemes: a voluntary scheme; a scheme called at that stage a universal scheme, under which the card would have to be held by everybody; and a compulsory scheme, under which everyone would have to carry the card. From the start, the last option was excluded and the Government looked at either a voluntary scheme or a universal scheme, which we would now call compulsory: compulsory to have and not to carry.
	One of the crucial arguments came from the opponents of ID cards, who said that any such scheme would have to become compulsory, or it would be useless. There was no point in discussing the subject on the basis of a voluntary scheme, which would not work and would not fulfil the most fundamental objectives. In the response to the White Paper, it was recognised by both sides that there was no point in proceeding with an ID scheme if it were to be purely voluntary.
	That emphasises something that my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow must know, as he and his colleagues advanced the argument at that stage. If the amendment were passed, it would be a wrecking amendment and would cut out the heart of the Bill. Anyone with an open mind who is listening to what my hon. Friend says about the amendment must bear in mind the fact that the purpose of the amendment is to disable the entire Bill and to make it of no value.
	At the end of the day, we must look at the fundamental point of the Bill—that we should have a list of names of all the people in this country. We already have many lists of names: a national insurance list of about 40 million names; the Inland Revenue list containing a similar number; the Passport Agency list of 38 million people; and the council tax registers, which contain a similar number. The electoral register contains 40 million people's names. The only difference between the national identity register and all these lists is that the national identity list will be correct.
	For example, the national insurance register has 75 million names on it, so clearly it cannot be correct. We cannot be sure that all the other lists are correct. The advantage of the national identity register is that we would use modern technology to ensure that the list that we have of people in this country is correct. Biometric technology will enable us to do that for the first time in our history.

Question accordingly negatived.
	It being after quarter past Seven o'clock, Mr. Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put the Question to be decided at that hour.

Patrick Mercer: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in page 7, line 20 [Clause 8], after 'individual', insert—
	'(aa) must be free of charge;'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 19, in page 31, line 26 [Clause 37], leave out paragraph (c).

Andy Burnham: As the scheme progresses, we shall seek to share more information. The Chairman of the Select Committee made the valuable point that being open about the procurement process could strengthen the scheme.
	My right hon. Friend also mentioned the possible cost of constant re-registration by people moving house. As he will know, addresses are currently printed on the front of driving licences. I do not think it would be sensible to require people to obtain a new identity card every time they moved house. We want a system enabling people easily to communicate a change of address to those who run the scheme, but I take his point. He also mentioned the chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, and the recommendation that a group should be established to consider the efficacy of biometrics. I can tell him that a biometrics assurance group, a Government group, is being set up under Sir David chairmanship.
	The issues are coming into sharper focus now that we have reached a point at which rigorous testing is necessary. Regular meetings have already been scheduled for the next 12 months, and the Home Office has recently appointed a senior biometrics adviser from the private sector.

Question accordingly negatived.
	It being after Nine o'clock, Madam Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put the Questions to be decided at that hour.

Amendment made: No. 4, in page 37, line 29, after '1(5)', insert 'and (5A)'.—[Andy Burnham.]
	Order for Third Reading read.

Charles Clarke: No, I shall not.
	That is why the introduction of identity cards needs to proceed incrementally, building on our plans for biometric passports.
	Let me reassert the benefits of the scheme. First, ID cards will help to tackle identity fraud, which now costs the UK economy and society more than £1.3 billion a year. Secondly, a secure identity system will help to prevent terrorist activity, more than a third of which makes use of false identities. Thirdly, identity cards will make it far easier to control immigration and illegal working, and British citizens will be able to use their identity cards instead of a passport to travel in Europe. Fourthly, ID cards will secure the more efficient and effective provision of public services.
	The scheme will not create threats to privacy or change the way we live our lives, as many have alleged. We have never proposed a scheme under which it would be compulsory to carry a card or which would require the production of an identity card to the police. The Bill also sets limits on the information that can be held on the register. It will not contain information about criminal convictions, financial records or political or religious opinions. Indeed, on Report, we have just amended the Bill so that it will not be possible to add a police national computer number to the register. No one will have access to the national identity register other than those operating it. What the Bill allows is for information to be provided from the register either with the consent of the individual or without that consent in strictly limited circumstances in accordance with the law of the land.
	The introduction of ID cards will take place incrementally. The first stage will be to introduce the scheme and to enable everyone to register and obtain a biometric ID card when, for example, they apply for or renew a passport. However, a stand-alone ID card will also be available for British citizens who do not hold a passport. It will make it quicker and easier to obtain Criminal Records Bureau clearance for people who have already had their identity verified by obtaining an ID card. Registration will be enforced through civil, not criminal, penalties, which will offer flexibility to deal sympathetically with the circumstances of any individual case.
	On costs, we estimate, as the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Leigh has already set out, that the total average annual running costs for issuing passports and ID cards to UK nationals will be £584 million. The Bill provides for a range of services to be covered by fees, such as approving an organisation before it can make checks against the register and usage fees for identity checks. It is right in my opinion that organisations benefiting from the checks should fund those costs.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	Bill read the Third time, and passed.

Lindsay Hoyle: I believe that this is an important debate about procurement and about its effects if we do not get it right. I shall touch on many issues, but I start with Royal Ordnance, which is based all over the country, though I am particularly concerned with the Chorley site. Royal Ordnance at Chorley still employs 200 people, so it is an important employer. It produces initiators. It is the only site within the BAE Systems umbrella that can produce initiators, which means that security of supply would be put at risk if the Chorley site were closed.
	I am very concerned that BAE Systems and Royal Ordnance seem to think that there will be an alternative. We know that they have shopped around in Singapore and sought to find out who could supply initiators if they were not produced at Chorley. I assure everyone that we should not put at risk our supply to the armed forces. It is a major risk, particularly in times of crisis and when we are committed all over the world. The one thing that the troops require is ammunition that can be trusted. Our ammunition can be trusted because it is produced thoroughly by RO from start to finish. We should not allow BAE or RO to weasel their way out of commitment to the Chorley site.
	Yes, there has been a problem with production at the Chorley site and, tragically, someone lost their life on that facility. I would not like to think that someone had lost their life in vain. BAE must look at the line again, put in the necessary investment and ensure that it is safe. I do not want it to take the easy option of closing the facility down. We should put the investment in and ensure that the commitment signed with the Government to ensure the supply of ammunition continues. That means using Chorley. We should not let BAE off the hook. BAE would be the first to complain to MPs if the Government were to renege on an order. So when it is the other way round, we should not let BAE renege on its agreement regarding Royal Ordnance.
	Aerospace is another important subject. Much is said and made of the joint strike fighter, but there is a big worry about it. We know that the Americans are still holding back and the international traffic in arms regulations waiver is still in place. The Americans are still not fully committed to letting the technology come through to us. The other problem is that we need to see final assembly of the jets that we are to order and we need to secure those jobs. Some of the highest skills in the country are based in Lancashire. All that could be put at risk because we cannot get the agreement of the Americans. Well, if there is a special relationship out there, it is time that the Prime Minister used it. We should be securing those jobs in Lancashire by getting what we need.
	Another company called CSC Computer Sciences employs many people in Chorley, delivering high-tech services for BAE Systems. There is talk about a new company, Alfred McAlpine Systems, and I am worried. A long-established link between BAE and CSC has delivered the systems that ensure that nuclear submarines sail safely. All that could be put at risk and we must think about using untried and untested companies that do not have a background in what we are asking for.

Lindsay Hoyle: Quite rightly my hon. Friend is standing up for the workers at St. Athan, where there is a highly skilled work force and a great background in servicing jets. The MOD must ensure that work goes to that factory as well and that we do not lose this country's skills.
	There is a worry about Alfred McAlpine Systems and about the software, and we must not allow anybody to tender for work without a proven track record. That brings me to the subject of the Army uniforms with which the MOD decided they wanted to be supplied.
	A company called Cooneen, Watts and Stone tendered for the contract, and a so-called company in Belgium was meant to be supplying. However, behind all the smoke and mirrors was a state-owned and, no doubt, subsidised factory in China. We have ended up sending work from this country to China, which has meant jobs being lost in Lancashire. A factory in the constituency of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw), has closed; that is how bad it has got.
	The Prime Minister was questioned on this matter. I understand that he is briefed, that he does not know everything and that he answers on the basis of what he is told. He was told, "Do not worry, this will not only protect jobs in Northern Ireland but increase them." That is not the case; there are fewer jobs now than before the company got the contract. That was another red herring and we were all hoodwinked once more.
	I am worried about my constituents at the Pincroft factory in Adlington, which has a great reputation for bleaching and dyeing and producing these uniforms, which they have done for many years. The camouflage is good enough to be used around the world, but it is not good enough for here. As usual, we have penny-wise and pound-foolish policies. It is meant to be about saving money, but it is not.

Lindsay Hoyle: Absolutely. It is daft. We are giving jobs to China yet Peter Mandelson the commissioner is asking why we are allowing all these textiles in from China and saying that we have to put some barriers up and that we are going to reduce the amount coming in from China next year. At the same time, we are putting the making of uniforms out there. I agree with my hon. Friend.
	The worry is that we are getting uniforms with faults on them. There are worries about the safety of our soldiers. Why are we doing it? Why are we putting soldiers at risk? Why do we not stop the order now and have a full investigation? Let us put the jobs where they belong—where the taxpayer expects; back in this country supporting the textile workers in Lancashire. Let us have enough of this nonsense. Let us do something about it. Let us have an end to the Chinese market and the Chinese takeaway in this country.

Lindsay Hoyle: It is fair to say that a mixture of explosives has to be used up because it is too volatile to be moved. So the company will have to run the site to run down what is on site. The agreement was that the material would be supplied from this country and from within BAE Systems sites, and that is what the MOD is trying to get out of.

Adam Ingram: I was coming on to that. Obviously, the MOD's interest is in securing long-term security of supply. My hon. Friend is absolutely right on that. It may be helpful if I set out our policy in this area.
	The significance of the munitions strategic supply position was underlined when the framework partnering agreement—the FPA—was signed in December 1999 between the MOD and RO Defence, which now trades as BAE Systems Land Systems. The FPA covers the majority of the MOD general munitions range, including initiators, and is due to expire in March 2010.
	The FPA provided a significant step toward achieving a sustainable UK source for general munitions supply and is projected to exceed the financial targets envisaged. Obviously, we are looking to build on that success. Because of that success, we have also recently underpinned our partnership with BAE Systems in the munitions field, through the signing of a new set of partnering principles. That provides a demonstration of commitment to a long-term objective for munitions provision.
	At the same time, we are examining the supply of munitions provision beyond 2010 through project MASS—or munitions acquisition, the supply solution. The general munitions position will form one element of the wider defence industrial strategy. The DIS is a logical development of the defence industrial policy, which we set out in 2002, and is aimed at ensuring that the capability requirements of the armed forces can be met now and in the future. Conclusions on the DIS will be reached by the end of this calendar year. Industry continues to be involved in that work and, of course, the trade unions are also heavily engaged in the discussions.
	I have given the background to the situation and I hope that it serves to indicate the seriousness with which the Government view strategic defence industrial issues in general, and munitions supply issues in particular. We are conscious of the need for security of supply in munitions, and we also recognise that we need to get to grips with the range of systems and equipment delivered by British industry. We need to examine what is achievable in terms of the retention of key industries. That will take time. We will need to talk to industry and it will not be an easy process. We will wait and see how that plays out, but the process is consistent with the views expressed by my hon. Friend.
	My hon. Friend referred to the possible closure of the Chorley site, and we are aware that the company is considering options for various parts of its business. My officials have engaged with the company on that, to ensure that its plans are compatible with our needs. It is a matter for the company, but it has to ensure that it meets the agreement laid down in 1999 and the new set of partnering principles. My hon. Friend will recognise that I cannot comment on those discussions in this forum, nor speculate on future outcomes, not least because they are fundamentally commercial matters for the company itself.
	My hon. Friend also raised the question of the cut and sewn contract. He knows very well the background to the contract award. Indeed, from what he said tonight, he obviously has a detailed knowledge of it. He correctly pointed out the extensive correspondence and communication between the previous Secretary of State and me, including meetings with the trade unions, hon. Members and representatives of industry to hear their concerns. As a result, we reviewed the cut and sewn garments contract earlier this year. We examined the process used for the procurement, the outcome of tender evaluation and the decision taken. We also revisited the capability of the winning contractor, Cooneen, Watts and Stone. At the end of that exhaustive process, we concluded that there was no reason to alter the original decision. I want to make it clear—as we have done on previous occasions—that the contract was let after a fair and open competition against published criteria. Cooneen, Watts and Stone was the clear winner against those criteria.
	Under the five-year contract, Cooneen, Watts and Stone will supply the MOD with up to 2 million individual items of clothing a year. The contract will gradually replace some 60 individual contracts for clothing supply and will save the tax payer £23 million over the contract life, by comparison to previous arrangements. Sub-contract opportunities exist for previous suppliers to present themselves competitively to the prime contractor over the life of the five-year contract.
	Having examined the matter, I genuinely believe that the contract is an excellent example of how the MOD is making procurement smarter and better. We have taken away a complicated supply chain and put in place a straightforward contract under which sub-contractors can bid, and have made a significant £23 million saving. We are determined that our armed forces should have the best clothing appropriate for the extreme environments in which they may be asked to serve and the demanding nature of the tasks they undertake.
	Again, having examined the issue, we are confident that Cooneen, Watts and Stone can meet those demands, while providing good value for money to the taxpayer. That confidence has been recently reinforced by the results of the first annual contract review. Savings in excess of £1 million have been made to date, and those savings are in addition to the £23 million in savings already secured by comparison with previous arrangements. Cost and quality targets are being achieved and exceeded. The bulk fabric was tested by a UK accredited laboratory ahead of the main production run and conformed to the required specification. Finished garments have also been randomly tested by a UK accredited laboratory.
	Clearly, I will take on board the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chorley. If he had cared to write to us before the debate, we could have had answers for the debate this evening. I have no problem about saying that the equipment is the best in the world. I could hardly see the jacket against the green Benches—that shows how good the camouflage is—but I take the point that, if serious imperfections have been brought to his attention, I am duty bound to investigate them.
	We have received no complaints from units. As I have said before at the Dispatch Box, I am fortunate that I am one of those people who probably meet more serving members of the armed forces than any other hon. Member, given the way I get round our estate and meet our people. The issue has never been raised with me, and the members of the armed forces do not hold back: they tell me what they think, and they have not told me about this. That does not mean that there is no problem, but it has not been brought to my attention until this evening.
	I am also aware of my hon. Friend's concerns about the overseas element of the contract. As I have said before in the House, the idea that there was a sole British manufacturer seeking to place all its output in the UK sector is simply wrong. Countries that appeared on the list of bidding companies included Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Sri Lanka, Dubai, as well as China. UK companies are free to trade with Chinese companies. I do not know whether he is arguing for an embargo on trade with China.